Due to its constrained nature, the use of smart RFID technology introduces tremendous security and privacy issues. This paper presents IMAKA-Tate: Identity protection, Mutual Authentication and Key Agreement using Tate pairing of Identity-based Encryption method. It is designed to tackle various challenges in the constrained nature of RFID applications by applying a light-weight cryptographic method with advanced-level 128 bit security protection. Thus, IMAKA-Tate protects the RFID system from various security and privacy threats (e.g. unauthorized tracking, cloning attack, etc.).
Introduction & Motivation
The emerging of sensor integration to RFID system called smart RFID has recently attracted a lot of interest in research and development. It is a prominent technology that is projected to be massively deployed in various applications, ranging from e-Health, transportation, human and device tracking, to distinctive applications like in military system. Indeed, such technology introduces considerable advantages reaching from economical aspects like low cost implementation and maintenance, to technical aspects like reliability and accuracy, as well as its flexibility to be integrated in large-scale system. Nevertheless, smart RFID system introduces tremendous security and privacy issues derived from the vulnerability nature of Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) applications, as well as various issues elicited from the use of tracking and positioning techniques itself. The following list outlines such issues that must be tackled in smart RFID system. Smart RFID tag is basically a device with limited resources in term of CPU, memory, bandwidth/data-rate, and energy/battery storage. Such limitations make the smart RFID tag is highly susceptible to various threats that are also common in WSN. One of them is various techniques of resource consumption attacks. These attacks are conducted by repeatedly sending packet to drain the battery and misspend the bandwidth.  The constrained nature of RFID system makes the security enforcement is more complicated. On the other hand, common security and privacy solution, such as using Transport Layer Security (TLS/SSL) is not feasible. Indeed, TLS/SSL suffers from various problems reaching from various security threats (e.g. MITM attacks), to communication and computation overheads that would overburden the limited capabilities of smart RFID system. This paper presents IMAKA-Tate, a light-weight identity protection and mutual authentication using Identity-based Encryption (IBE) method. Particularly, it relies on cryptographic Tate (ƞT) pairing over super singular elliptic curves, ternary field [1] . IMAKATate method is tailored to tackle the specific challenges for security and privacy in the constrained nature of smart RFID. Moreover, in order to achieve efficient communication overhead, the authentication mechanism fully relies on link layer security method, particularly over IEEE 802.15.4 which is commonly used to deliver low-data rate. Thus it is affordable to be applied in the restricted smart RFID environment.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section II, we outline previous works that associates to our work. In section III presents the protocol design of IMAKA-Tate. In Section IV, we analyze the security aspects of IMAKA-Tate. Section V presents the computation analysis. Finally, we conclude our work in Section VI.
Related Work
Our work associates to broad field of research works as smart RFID system is established based on multi aspects of wireless communication system. This section resumes several existing solutions that relate to our work.
IMAKA-Tate [13] is our prior work which aims at providing novel security and privacy method tailored to tackle the security and privacy challenges in Wireless Indoor Positioning (WIP) system. Particularly, we demonstrated that our method provide security and privacy solution that is feasible for the constrained nature of WIP. In this paper, we follow up our work by analyzing how the IMAKA-Tate can also be used for specific challenges in the smart RFID system.
Mulkey, Kar and Katangur [3] , purposed an efficient protocol for authentication and privacy in wireless networks IEEE 802.11 using IBE techniques. Particularly, they enhanced the existing WPA protocol by incorporating IBE based authentication methods. However, distinct to our work, we purpose a mutual authentication and key agreement with identity protection. Our proposed solution is to ensure the privacy preserving and to provide access control that only legitimate party can participate in the smart RFID system. Furthermore, to support large-scale system, we purpose in detail the enhancement of mutual authentication mechanism by transporting the authentication messages over Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) method.
One of earlier works on IBE authentication and key exchange was purposed by Kolesnikov and Sundaram, called Identity-Based Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol (IBAKE) [5] . In IBAKE method, the authors improved the limitation of Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) that suffer from corrupt Key Management Service (KMS) or key escrow problem [6] [7] . In order to achieve the integrity protection, IBAKE method also provides mutual authentication with perfect forward and backward secrecy. The sequence work of IBAKE is defined in RFC 6539 [8] that described how key exchange and encryption-decryption mechanism are performed using standard of Boneh-Franklin [9] and Boneh-Boyen [10] . Currently, they are also proposing in detail how to carry IBAKE messages using EAP in the on progressing work [11] . In conclusion, IBAKE is a potential security protocol for mutual authentication and privacy preserving. Nevertheless such protocol is not feasible for RFID system, since the protocol must be relied on upper layer method using TLS. Indeed, using TLS method can drain the limited capabilities of RFID tag. Moreover, it utilizes expensive cryptographic method that is too heavy for the smart RFID system.
In the context of IBE for WSN, Szczechowiak and Collier [4] proposed TinyIBE using ƞT pairing to disprove the argument that using IBE is too heavy for sensor node. They demonstrated that it is feasible to enforce the ƞT pairing even on at very constrained nodes. However, all nodes in the proposed solution are assumed as static node without movement. It is therefore not suitable for smart RFID tag that is highly mobile and pervasive computing. Furthermore, TinyIBE method only provides secure key distribution, instead of providing mutual authentication and identity protection. Thus, it does not protect various threats of MTIM attacks.
Proposed Scheme
This section describes IMAKA-Tate as proposed scheme to tackle various challenges in the constrained nature smart RFID system.
Preliminaries
To tackle the specific challenges in smart RFID system, IMAKA-Tate [13] early establishes encryption even before the authentication is started. In this context, the entire communication data including the RFID tag identity are transported in encrypted payload. Furthermore, to achieve light-weight and feasible communication overhead, we apply ƞT pairing that is known as the fastest pairing method [2] . In Principal, the cryptographic processing relies on ternary field defined in [1] , specifically using the extension field . Such extension field is applied in order to provide advanced-level 128 bit security strength of IBE, which is about same security level as 3072 bit RSA method [1] [3] .
In the smart RFID networks, we propose two parties (i.e. RFID reader and RFID tag) perform mutual authentication to each other. Particularly, they communicate over standard IEEE 802.15.4f, which defines standard wireless Physical (PHY) and Media access control (MAC) for active RFID. In addition, each smart RFID tag has sufficient co-processor to perform cryptographic processing, as the tag is integrated in standard sensor platform, such as Imote2 with diverse options of core frequency (i.e. 104, 208, 312 and 416 MHz).
Setup Phase
On the setup phase, the Key Generation Function (KGF) privately distributes all parameters that are needed to construct the IBE method. The KGF is handled by the administrator, who privately preloads all parameters to each legitimate reader and smart RFID tag memory. It is to be noted that all parameters are shared prior to network deployment. In this case, the existence of KGF is no longer needed after the KGF successfully shares all parameters including private keys and all public parameters. This method is to ensure that only legitimate entity can participate in the smart RFID system.
During the setup phase, the KGF initially generates overall parameters that will be confidentially preloaded to each reader and RFID tag's memory. The generated secret parameters include a 128 bit integer master secret key s, where s ∈ * . Supersingular elliptic curve define over * , *
. A random point on elliptic curve P as part of public parameter, where P ∈ E( ).
Additional random point as another part of public parameter Q, where Q ∈ E( ) and Q = sP. Furthermore, the KGF also generates public parameter g = e(P, P). In this context, e is a function that maps E( ) x E( ) → . In addition, two more parameters are defined as hash functions. The first one is H1, it is hash function to convert a binary RFID identity to a 128 bit integer, where H1 : 0, 1 * → * . The second one is H2, this hash function is to convert a parameter on extension filed to a 128 bit integer, where H2 :
Instead of distributing the master secret key s, the KGF generates all private keys of all RFID devices and then preloads all the keys on the setup phase. This mechanism is conducted in order to simplify key distribution and to achieve feasible computation overhead. In the other word, the readers and RFID tags do not have to generate their own private keys, thus efficient computation effort can be achieved. The private key for each RFID tag generated by KGF is denoted as T = P, where s is master secret key and t = H1(RFID tag MAC Address) is a public key of the RFID Tag. The same way to calculate reader private key R = P, where r is public key of the reader calculated as r = H1(reader MAC Address). In overall the KGF preloads (Private Key (T or R), e, P, Q, g, H1 and H2) to each legitimate RFID Tag and RFID Reader's memory.
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Moreover, the rogue reader cannot correctly calculate the initial session key i, since:
(7) Since the initial session key i is calculated incorrectly, the rogue reader cannot decrypt the initiation message ƞT (C1, C2, t) . Hence, the rogue reader cannot find the tag MAC Address in order to respond the message. Moreover, the challenge is more complicated for adversary, as it is not possible to convert t value to tag MAC address based on the incorrect parameter H1', since:
t ≠ H1'(tag MAC address) (8) An adversary may conduct social engineering to inquiry the tag's MAC Address attached on the user device. However, the adversary in this case the rogue reader is still not able to correctly generate the tag's public key and the two ciphertexts based on the incorrect parameters. This issue makes the tag is not able to calculate the temporary session key j. Let us presume that the rogue reader generates t' ≠ t, C3' ≠ C3 and C4' ≠ C4: t' = H1'(tag MAC address)
However the tag wrongly calculates the key j, since:
Hence, the tag aborts the connection as the value of C1 and C2 attached on ƞT(C3', C4', C1, C2,) cannot be verified. Furthermore, both parties are not able to correctly generate and share the primary session key, as the tag calculates:
On the other hand the rogue reader calculates:
By taking into account an adversary has chance to steal the unsupervised RFID tag. In this case, an adversary can copy all valid parameters (i.e. e, P, Q, g, H1 and H2) that are needed to impersonate as rogue reader. However, the master secret key s is owned only by the KGF and it is never shared to any party, neither to the reader nor to the tag. This challenge makes the adversary cannot generate the correct private key for the rogue reader. Let us presume that the rogue reader use incorrect master secret key k ≠ s. The rogue reader incorrectly generates its private key : = P (15) Hence the rogue reader is not able to generate correct initial session key i as described in equation (1) and (2), since: 
Privacy Issue and Attacks from RFID Tag
As RFID tag can naturally be read without authorization, this issue introduces tremendous problem related to privacy of RFID user. An adversary can reveal the tag identity and observe sensitive information, in order to perform malicious activates, which are listed as follows.  An adversary may conduct unauthorized tracking based on the revealed identity. This issue definitely introduces tremendous problem as an adversary may conduct further malicious activates (e.g. espionage, theft, robbery, etc.).  An adversary may conduct unauthorized tag reading in order to elicit sensitive information that can be used for impersonation activities (e.g. masquerading as legitimate RFID tag). This issue makes an adversary has chance to conduct unwanted activities such as fraudulence.
 An adversary can perform various techniques of resource consumption attacks based on the revealed identity. The adversary can waste the tag bandwidth and drain the battery by insistently sending packets to the revealed identity as destination address.  An adversary initially reveals the user identity as one of requirements that is needed to successfully perform various attacks (i.e. replay attack, sybil attack, and various attacks based on revealed identity). Nevertheless, IMAKA-Tate performs the encryption method that includes the tag identity since in the initiation request of mutual authentication. Particularly, the tag firstly hashes its MAC Address to 128 bit integer n = H1(tag MAC address). Subsequently, it is enclosed to the encrypted payload of the initiation request ƞT(C1, C2, n). Hence, there is no chance for an adversary to reveal the user identity since it encrypts even before the mutual authentication is started.
Security Features
The following list outlines the security features offered by IMAKA-Tate [13] , which is also match to provide trust and integrity protection in smart RFID environment.  Mutual Authentication and Key Agreement:
IMAKA-Tate establishes mutual authentication that each participant generates random challenge, which is encrypted by the corresponding public key of the recipient. Such mechanism ensures that only targeted recipient can decrypt and correctly answer the challenge. This procedure is conducted in mutual way. In this case, they exchange and verify the ciphertexts of (C1, C2) and (C3, C4). This feature can also prevent various MITM attacks (e.g. replay attack, reflection attack, DoS, etc.). Furthermore, both parties simultaneously negotiate the primary session key based on the exchanged challenge. In particular, the reader and the tag calculate the same session key: figure 3 , the maximum size of authentication packet is only 72 Bytes, which is transported in EAP respond-IBE Challenge (see figure 2) . Therefore, it is suitable for RFID system that associates to limited resources, such as low-date rate, limited CPU and battery.  Light-weight cryptographic operation with highlevel security strength: IMAKA-Tate uses 128 bit security strength of ƞT paring. This method is known as the most light-weight cryptographic operation, even it is feasible for the most constrained sensor node [4] . In addition, such security strength is about same as the 3072 bit of RSA method. Thus, it is strong enough to protect the RFID system against various techniques of brute-force attacks.
Computation Analysis
In order to ensure that cryptographic processing in IMAKA-Tate is feasible for smart RFID system, we estimated computation overhead by conducting benchmark tests adopted from [3] . The benchmark tests estimated the computation overhead of all parameters that are needed to construct 128 bit ƞT pairing over . The code of such benchmark test is written in C++ adapted from [1] , which was compiled with Visual Studio 2008. The benchmark test was executed in our platform under Windows 7 with 64-bit Intel 2 Cores at 1.8 GHz. In order to emulate the smart RFID system, we forced the processor to run in single core and scaling down the clock frequency according to three options of Imote2 platform (i.e. 104 MHz, 208 MHz and 416 MHz). In addition, to achieve accurate estimation the benchmark test executed the cryptographic operations in multiple times (i.e. 1000 iterations). We further calculated basic operations of each phase in IMAKA-Tate. The first phase is three-way handshake of mutual authentication, while the second phase is primary session key generation. Table I summarizes computation overhead of IMAKA-Tate calculated by each smart RFID tag. On the mutual authentication phase, each participant calculates the same parameters which are two Multiplication over , one Exponentiation over and one ƞT Pairing. After both parties have successfully authenticated to each other, they afterward generate the primary session key by each calculating one more ƞT Pairing. It is to be noted that we only show the computation result of RFID tag, as we assume that the reader has stronger processor clock to process the cryptographic operation. According to the benchmark test implied in Table I , the RFID tag at 416 MHz calculated both phases which are mutual authentication and generating primary session key in 0.046 sec. On the other hand, the RFID tag at 104 MHz calculated both phases in 0.11 sec. It is therefore concluded, IMAKA-Tate method is remarkably feasible to be applied in smart RFID system. It is even affordable for the smart RFID tag with lower coprocessor clock at 104 MHz.
Conclusion
IMAKA-Tate offers light-weight identity protection and mutual authentication that satisfies the specific requirement for security and privacy in smart RFID system. In this regards, the proposed solution performs encryption of the smart RFID tag identity even before the mutual authentication is started. This method prevents the tag identity from being revealed by unauthorized party. Therefore, privacy preserving can be achieved well. Furthermore, the security analysis of IMAKA-Tate has demonstrated that it can mitigate various possible threats in the smart RFID system, including unauthorized tracking and tag reading, cloning attack, impersonation, and resource consumption attack. Moreover, we demonstrated in the computation analysis that IMAKA-Tate is feasible to be applied in the constrained nature of smart RFID system.
